Tusting Our Schools?

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Over ten years ago I contributed a chapter to a book edited by well-known British educator Michael Fielding¹ that looked at the on–going efforts of the British Labour Party under Tony Blair to effect significant educational change. My contribution entitled The Two Solitudes: Policy makers and policy implementers ² explored the apparent inability of these usually well-meaning ‘solitudes’ to understand and work harmoniously to improve learning for students in schools. Although my chapter described how the ‘two solitudes’ held different views on the sources of change, strategies for change, theories of action, purposes of change and the success criteria for change, I always felt there was something missing in my analysis. Now, after ten years and many trips to many places to observe and participate in change efforts, I think I know the missing ingredient –trust.

Simply stated, trust is the glue that binds, or sadly in many cases distrust is the toxin that divides, the ‘solitudes.’ It is the element that creates the confidence among participants that accelerates change, or the suspicion that slows it down, or in the extreme buries it³. It is a central tenet of civil democratic societies. In the words of Tom Friedman of the New York Times, “you can’t have a democracy without trust and you can’t have citizens without trust –without trust that everyone will be treated with equality, no matter who is in power, and without trust and shared vision in what kind of society people are trying to build”⁴
Trust is both a psychological and sociological construct. At the psychological level it is at the very heart of all healthy personal relationships - child and Mother, student and teacher, employee and boss, husband and wife. When relationships go sour the starting point for reconciliation is trust. From a sociological perspective, trust differentiates between winners and losers. Teams, companies, school faculties or school systems that build trusting relationships and mutual confidence promote optimism and growth cycles, whereas low trust organizations breed disengagement, timidity and apprehension that lead to ‘circles of doom’ that further erode confidence, and energy. In high trust organizations, policy makers and policy implementers share a bond built around common notions of organizational purposes, competence, honesty and transparency.

It is my observation that highly successful schools and school districts and provincial, state and national school systems have built strong bonds of trust between and among policy makers and policy implementers. Conversely, policy makers in less successful schools and school systems tend to foment distrust, anxiety, and in some situations, downright hostility and fear among the very people who must implement policies. In turn, policy implementers in low trust environments respond by overtly or covertly sabotaging change efforts, gaming verification systems, or engaging in militant union activities. Research by Paul Zak, an American neuroeconomist supports this observation. Nations such as Finland, Japan and Canada that score very high on Zak’s measures of national trust also score very well on comparative educational assessments of student achievement such as PISA. It was American President Ronald Reagan who made the phrase, “trust but verify” famous. The challenge for those interested in
educational change is to find the right balance between trust and verification. Too much trust leaves policy makers vulnerable politically and professionally, and too much verification strips policy implementers of their autonomy and stifles creativity and innovation. Trusting relationships in schools and systems fall somewhere between two extreme poles- total paranoia in which verification strategies destroy trusting relationships and blind trust in which trust is absolute, with little or no effort to verify whether trust is justified in terms of results. I suggest that all school, district, state, provincial and even national school systems fit somewhere within the following schemata that reflects the degree to which policy makers and policy implementers trust each other to pursue organizational purposes and the intensity with which policy makers seek to verify policy implementers’ behaviours.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Blind trust</th>
<th>High trust</th>
<th>Conditional trust</th>
<th>Low trust</th>
<th>Paranoia</th>
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Let me describe each and provide some examples.

*Paranoic schools* and systems exist where trust is virtually non-existent and few are prepared to risk any deviation from required expectations for fear of punishment.

Verification techniques are pervasive. Data is not to inform, but to decide. Inspections are to find fault and not to encourage and improve. Adherence to petty and intrusive procedures is the order of the day. Deviation is akin to treason and punishment follows swiftly. Information is carefully husbanded by those in authority and used strategically to
reward or punish. For example, in Sustainable Leadership Andy Hargreaves and I
described Len Adomo, the principal of Sheldon High School who ran his school like an
internment camp and excluded all but a few from key information and decision making
processes. His constant intrusions into the teachers’ professional practices and his lack of
 elemental levels of trust created an armed camp as teachers migrated to their union as a
way to survive in a noxious environment. The school’s students of course were the ones
caught in the middle of this non-trusting standoff.

My personal favorite paranoid was Ed, a secondary school principal who asked
the staff members of his school to rate his performance. He spent the next three months
analyzing handwriting and then confronting and dressing down those who deigned to be
critical. This is the same fellow who wrote ten pages of closely written paranoia in
response to the superintendent’s simple request to include assistant principals in
administrative meetings so they could learn what was going on in the system. His staff
lived in fear of his displeasure and every April studiously studied the advertisement for a
transfer to another setting. Needless to say we all have our stories of paranoid colleagues
and superiors who squeezed the very life-blood out of organizations. I haven’t run across
a totally paranoid school system yet, but a few are getting close. Based on my reading,
Wisconsin and Louisiana in the U.S. sounds like good candidates.

Low Trust schools and systems exist when policy makers sacrifice the trust of policy
implementers in an organization in the name of quick, easily measured, politically
motivated results that are often accompanied by a plethora of invasive and often punitive
verification measures. The recent situation in England provides a good illustration of a
low trust educational system. In 1996, I joined with some friends and colleagues at the Institute of Education in London England to listen to the leader of the opposition Labour Party speak on education. The young articulate, and charismatic Tony Blair talked about the need to improve education by investing in the quality of teachers and leaders, opening access to first class education for all children regardless of home background, and promoting a more collaborative and less adversarial educational climate. If someone had taken a vote that day, Blair would have got every one, including mine. He was very persuasive. Shortly thereafter he and his party won an overwhelming majority in the next election, and proceeded to do many of the things they had promised by investing heavily in individual teacher and leaders’ development, and improving the chances for a quality education for the less fortunate. It appeared in the early days that his government was well on its way to betting its electoral future on a ‘high trust’ school system. At the time I wrote my article for Michael Fielding in 2001, there was still a great deal of optimism that policy makers and policy implementers would collaborate to produce positive results for their school system.

But for some reason I never fathomed, Mr. Blair and his Labour colleagues kept most of the trappings of the previous Conservative government’s ‘low trust’ approach by maintaining its inspectoral regime, OFSTED and its leader the controversial Chris Woodhead, relatively unchecked and unchanged, ramping up even more pressure on schools to raise test scores, and adding a few more wrinkles like target-setting for schools followed by constantly moving goal posts. Blair’s government seemed to be a government in a hurry as it lurched from one new strategy to the next, and changed education ministers frequently. Schools would no sooner come to grips with one
initiative and another would be on the way. I spoke at a large conference in Birmingham on Beacon Schools in which the policymakers had invested substantial funds to build collaborative relationships among schools. This worthy effort inspired a great deal of energy and excitement only to languish as the government, presumably dissatisfied with the pace of change, moved on to something else. Three years after the conference I received a call from some school heads in Shropshire who said they had Beacon School money left over and would I do a workshop for them. Lost in this frenetic search for quick results through dependence on verification strategies such as testing, targets, inspections, and league tables was the need to build trusting relationships with the profession. An essential part of trust is predictability. As American management guru Warren Bennis suggests the keys to trusting relationships are “constancy and focus.” The approach under the British Labour had neither. It eroded its early good will and trust by its perseverance on the ‘ineffective drivers’ of change - fragmentation of initiatives, overemphasis on accountability to drive and verify change among individual teachers and schools and “investing in and assuming that the wonders of the digital world will carry the day v/s instruction.” Change was done to people not with people. Judging by recent international comparisons, the vast expenditures and many excellent and indeed in some cases brilliant policy initiatives of the Blair and later Gordon Brown governments have produced only modest improvements. The much vaunted literacy-numeracy initiative would appear to have yielded very little. The 2009 PISA results show that Britain’s 15 year olds finished only slightly above the OECD average in reading and somewhat below average in Mathematics. Sadly, an approach to improvement that began as a ‘high-trust’ vehicle for educational change became a ‘low trust’ push for politically useful
results defined solely in terms of test scores. Ironically, had the policy makers taken the time to develop and sustain a climate of trust, they could have eventually acted with speed and agility because they wouldn’t have expended so much energy and good will confronting antagonistic or defeatist behaviours from those who had to implement their policies.\textsuperscript{14}

 Conditional Trust occurs when policy makers promote trusting relationships with some parts of its implementer community by minimizing verification strategies such as inspections with some schools and districts while ramping up the pressure on the less successful. This is the pattern in England under David Cameron’s coalition government of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. Schools with 'Outstanding' or 'Good' ratings from OFSTED are inspected less frequently than schools with 'Satisfactory' or 'Unsatisfactory' judgments. This is basically monitoring in inverse relationship to success, and in times of fiscal austerity this is a good way to save money. There is however a direct negative relationship between deprivation and schools in the latter category. As a result, heads and teachers in less advantaged schools come under significantly more government pressure than those in more advantaged areas.

 The British reform pattern in recent months provides another example of conditional trust. Towards the end of Tony Blair’s tenure he and his policy makers decided to invest in a series of academies that would function outside of the control of local authorities and enjoy a degree of autonomy and more operating money than authority schools. The government along with outside individuals and agencies that invested two million British pounds would collaboratively build new secondary schools
to replace run down facilities in deprived areas. The good news of course is that students in these areas would get a new school and the government’s hope was that these private-public partnerships would open new avenues for innovation and reform. The bad news is that their governance would not only come from a board of local governors like other schools, but from the affluent contributors of the two million, which would appear to undermine the very principle of public education. From the government’s perspective, academies would allow underachieving secondary schools in deprived areas to break away from the limitations allegedly imposed by local authorities and strike out in bold new directions to address the needs of students.

While it is still too early to tell where the David Cameron coalition government that swept to power in 2010 is heading, there is no question that British education is in the midst of a huge shakeup that seems to fit my definition of ‘conditional trust’. While the previous government seemed to want to dictate directions for all schools, the new government has initiated a very aggressive policy of promoting two models of schools, both independent of local authority - academies not only at the secondary level but also the primary level (minus the new buildings) and free schools along the lines of Swedish free schools or American charter schools. It would appear that the government gives these types of schools more autonomy than those that remain with local authorities and encourages them to break out of traditional patterns of staffing, curriculum, and leadership structures. In other words, they can play by different rules than state schools. The reviews from my British colleagues are quite mixed. Some see this pattern as unfair and inequitable and a blatant effort to erode local control, promote privatized education,
and in the process exacerbate the class system in the country by advantaging middle class students. Seumas Milne writing in *The Guardian* declares that

> Academies are less accountable, less transparent, less locally integrated and less open to parental involvement (governors are appointed, not elected) than local authority schools, while the sponsors or companies that run them can bend the curriculum to their whim.¹⁶

Educators who work for local authorities see the traditional support and assistance of local authorities dissipated in a misguided attempt to download staff and leadership development to already burdened school people. From the other perspective, the government under the leadership of Michel Gove has moved quickly to tighten some of the practices that ‘gamed’ the system under Labour such as negotiating undemanding school targets, focusing teaching on ‘bubble’ children to make exam results look good, and tightening the secondary curriculum to prevent heads and others from directing students to less challenging courses to ensure good school exam results. Certainly some schools seem advantaged and trusted in the ‘brave new world’ of the coalition while others continue to experience the more debilitating aspects of a low trust environment.

America’s No Child Left Behind policy under both Presidents Bush and Obama operates on the principle that there are winners and losers and support and pressure are allocated accordingly. Conditional trust appears to operate in societies that experience great inequality between the rich and the poor and among affluent and impoverished
school districts. This inequity in most American states is the single most important reason that American schools languish at or below the median on most international measures of student proficiency.\textsuperscript{18}

Here is an example from Texas.

North of Dallas there is a well-to-do suburb called Highland Park. According to the last census "per capita money income in past 12 months" for Highland Park was $116,772 and "median household income 2005-2009" was $176,375. The median value of a home is $982,600 in Highland Park.

South of Fort Worth, there is a blue collar neighborhood called Everman. According to the same census "per capita money income in past 12 months" for Everman was $16,685 and "median household income 2005-2009" was $39,508. The median value of a home is $80,700 in Everman.

Highland Park receives $6013 per student and Everman $4973. Highland’s students are over 90% white whereas only 6.3% of Everman’s students are white. Everman’s teachers are paid on average $5000 per year less than Highland Park’s teachers. Here are the results for students:

- 4-year completion rate: Everman: 85.2%... Highland Park: 98.1%
- Met standard, sum of all tests: Everman: 67%... Highland Park: 98%
- College-ready (TSI)-English: Everman: 50% ... Highland Park: 93%
- College-ready (TSI)-Math: Everman: 58% ... Highland Park: 96%. \textsuperscript{19}
Needless to say, schools like Everman will be under great pressure to improve its results. In the words of John Kuhn, an outspoken Texas superintendent who has publicly opposed the inequities within the Texas funding system,

There is . . . in Texas a system called the Performance-Based Monitoring and Appraisal System. Through this system, it is also more likely that Everman might be required to undergo “improvement” regimens that are unlikely to affect Highland Park. (Texas records for) Everman . . . shows that PBMAS interventions have been required. I’m sure there are no interventions at Highland Park.

The sanctioning systems are designed to be different, supposedly to “help struggling schools.” However, when one school is funded at a lesser rate, it strikes me as sort of disingenuous to say, “Oh, you are underperforming; here are some top-down mandates to help you.” The state, via its funding mechanisms, is picking the winners and losers and then humiliating the losers with pejorative labels (well-publicized, of course), and then stepping in and saying, “Here, let us do that for you” and requiring a bunch of paperwork, improvement plans, committee meetings, and other tightly-controlled (but not necessarily effective) processes. Also noteworthy—schools that are “unacceptable” for a certain number of years in a row are subjected to an escalating array of sanctions, including extra verifications, replacement of teachers and administrators, and finally shutting down.20
If the pattern in Ontario where I live is any indication, good teachers in schools under pressure such as Everman will leave for greener pastures if they can, which usually leaves only the truly dedicated and less effective who no one else wants, and as a result the school continues its downward spiral and experiences even more pressure. *High Trust* organizations can act with speed and efficiency because they do not have to navigate turbulent seas of resistance, anger, incompetence, and disengagement. High quality schools and systems trust their educators and particularly teachers to deliver superior educational programs to all children. Diane Ravitch, noted American educator’s description of her visit to Finland captures this idea:

Teachers and principals repeatedly told me that the secret of Finnish success is trust. Parents trust teachers because they are professionals. Teachers trust one another and collaborate to solve mutual problems because they are professionals. Teachers and principals trust one another because all the principals have been teachers and have deep experience. When I asked about teacher attrition, I was told that teachers seldom leave teaching; it's a great job, and they are highly respected.

In a similar vein, Andy Hargreaves, a transplanted Brit who spent many years in Canada writes,

Canada has some striking commonalities with Finland, the only non-Asian performer above it in the PISA rankings. Both countries value teaching and insist on a professional programme of university-based training for all state school teachers. There are no Teach First or other programmes to bring people with
minimal training into the profession. Working conditions are supportive with good facilities, pay, professional development, and discretion for teachers to make their own judgments. Both countries have a strong commitment to state schools and only a very modest or non-existent private sector in education. Both countries have strong systems of social welfare and public health supported by appropriate taxation levels. Lastly, both nations are characterised by deeper cultures of co-operation and inclusiveness that actually makes them more competitive internationally.\textsuperscript{21}

It is interesting that both countries rank very highly on measures of public trust towards their institutions\textsuperscript{22} and both countries rely on the right drivers (I prefer ‘initiators’\textsuperscript{23}) – capacity building, group work, a focus on pedagogy and systemic solutions. But the “glue that binds the effective drivers together is the underlying attitude, philosophy or theory of action.”\textsuperscript{24} This is where trust comes in, not ‘naïve trust’, or ‘polyanna trust’ or ‘look the other way’ trust, but trust balanced by reasonable strategies for verification of effectiveness –“trust but verify.” Most Canadian provinces use some form of standardized testing to determine the efficacy of curriculum and to identify schools that need support, but for the most part provincial officials rely on local district leaders to ensure high quality programs and teaching. Generally, these verification strategies are mindful of teachers’ professionalism. For example, Ontario requirements mitigate against surprise inspections, and supervisory strategies tend to be of a collaborative-developmental nature.
Finland depends on cooperative structures of self-evaluation designed to “build cooperative structures and hear weak signals”. Rather than a focus on problem solving, Finnish educators use their cooperative networks to anticipate potential problems and develop improvement strategies before significant issues arise. Standardized testing, inspections, school choice and other trappings of low trust systems are alien to the Finnish school culture. As a high trust system, “Finland, . . . is a self-correcting, complex system in which negative deviance is rectified through participation and interaction rather than public exposure and intervention” To the paranoid or acolytes of low trust educational systems, the Finnish model may sound like ‘blind’ trust, but just about every piece of comparative educational evidence indicates that it works.

*Blind trust* implies that policy makers trust policy implementers in virtually all circumstances and no one bothers to verify whether this trust is appropriate. Investors in Bernie Mahoff’s ponzi scheme learned something about ‘blind’ trust, as did home owners who signed up for sub prime mortgages, and so did Barings’ when Nick Leeson destroyed the company. The idea of ‘blind’ trust for educators in the contemporary climate is an oxymoron, but there was a time, at least in some parts of the world that governments trusted educators to do what was right for students usually within very broad parameters. Ontario in the 1960s and 1970s is a case in point. The province produced quite broad curriculum guidelines and defined diploma requirements, but within these considerations, teachers and school principals had considerable leeway to design programs and practices to meet the needs of students. In the *Change Over Time* study, teachers and principals remembered the era as one of bold innovation, creativity and dedicated work. School districts and individual schools led this wave of
experimentation not the province. There were no standardized tests to teach to, and no provincial inspectors sitting in the back of rooms determined to find out what you were doing wrong based on some predetermined grocery list of ‘good’ teaching techniques.

But things changed in the 1980s. The population of the province grew dramatically, became more urbanized, and increasingly multi cultural. The province recognized that all school boards and schools were not created equal, and there was need for more centralized direction to ensure that all students received a first class education regardless of geography, ethnicity or ability. Provincial initiatives and legislation on special education, English as a second language (ESL) and aboriginal education attempted to bring increasingly more students into the mainstream and in the process mandated specific responsibilities for school boards, schools, and teachers. Ontario through the 1980s and early 1990s might be described as a ‘high trust’ jurisdiction because its professionals still had considerable autonomy within what most considered reasonable verification strategies, including some standardized testing that focused on the efficacy of the Ontario curriculum. In 1995, the world of Ontario educators took a decidedly ‘low trust’ turn. In the midst of one of Ontario’s worst recessions in years, a decidedly right wing political party euphemistically called the ‘Progressive’ Conservative party swept to power in the province. With them came all the trappings of a ‘low trust’ educational platform - high-stakes student testing with a pass-fail literacy test for 15 year olds, teacher testing, huge budget cuts, increased class sizes and teacher workload, and the predictable naming shaming and blaming that teachers in the U.K. and the U.S. had already experienced. By 2003, the provincial electorate had had enough of what Naomi Klein\textsuperscript{29} has called the ‘shock doctrine’ and elected a more moderate, middle of the road
party to try to rebalance the educational system. This Liberal government, which is still in power in the province, has certainly not reverted to the policies of ‘blind’ trust of bygone times, but as described previously, has tried to balance its trust in Ontario’s educator with reasonable verification strategies that appear to be well accepted by both the public and the educational community.

By eliminating the two extremes on my schemata we can draw some tentative conclusions based on observations of low trust and conditional trust systems and schools, when compared to high trust systems and schools. If we examine the U.K. educational system under new Labour and the present U.S. system as exemplars of low trust and conditional trust systems, and Finland and Canada as examples of high trust systems using the results of the 2009 Programme for International Student Assessment, we can conclude that high trust systems produce far superior student achievement, more resilient students, more equitable results, and greater efficiency in terms of money and time. Both Finland and particularly Canada have responded to changing immigration patterns more effectively and more quickly than either the United States or United Kingdom, and both high trust nations show considerably less variance in student achievement based on socio economic status than either the United Kingdom and the United States, with lower per pupil expenditures.

I suggest three possible reasons for this disparity - proximity, equity and professional capacity. Finland and Canada have decentralized systems so educational policy makers are closer to the school districts and schools and I would suggest more aware of the results of their policies. Britain is educationally quite centralized and over
the past 20 years both political parties have actively undermined the role and autonomy of local authorities. In fairness, there is a great deal of evidence that some authorities failed to serve the learning needs of the children adequately and necessitated strong verification strategies and interventions, but an approach for a few appears to have extended to all authorities regardless of competence and undermined a great deal of very good school improvement work. While the U.S. has historically prided itself on local control of education, federal legislation such as No Child Left Behind has made the government of the United States much more interventionist in determining educational policies in the 50 states and overrides the ability of local schools and districts to respond to the unique needs of their students. It would appear that trust, at least in western democratic societies, is inversely related to the proximity of policy makers to school districts and schools themselves.

Educational funding in both Finland and Canada is fairly equitable. In Canada, and Ontario particularly, some schools are better off than others because of the voluntary involvement of businesses and parent groups, but in general a school in Toronto and a school in Hearst in the very far north of Ontario operate on the essentially the same basic resource base, curriculum requirements, and salary schedules for teachers and principals. Like Finland, Canada is not into creating educational markets that pit one school against another but seeks to make every school successful.³⁸ Since American educational funding is largely dependent on property taxes, funding for education is a lingering and endemic problem that is always” the elephant in the room” when it comes to discussions of educational improvement.³⁹ The United States is one of very few OECD countries that has a higher pupil-teacher pupil ratio in areas of social deprivation.⁴⁰ While funding in
the United Kingdom is fairly equitable from school to school, choice policies have over time resulted in a concentration of social capital in some schools producing schools for the ‘haves’ and schools for the ‘have nots’.

Low trust systems appear to distrust the capacity and dedication of their teachers and principals (heads) to improve the quality of students’ learning, and therefore feel it necessary to dictate policies and procedures that are heavy on verification strategies. For example, the British chief inspector recently announced that the British school system had 5000 incompetent leaders.\(^{41}\) It is not that long ago that another British chief inspector declared that there were 15,000 incompetent teachers.\(^{42}\) Such arbitrary shaming and blaming pronouncements only deepens distrust in the system and make sustainable changes more difficult and more costly in the long run. If policy makers can’t trust their teachers and school leaders then the obvious question is why not? If in fact they are incapable of positive change, then for the sake of students’ learning top down directives, stringent verification strategies, and expedients like Teacher First and Teach for America and Future Leaders\(^{43}\) might be appropriate in the short term. But these ‘low trust’ strategies will never deliver long-term sustainable excellence. Conversely, teachers and school leaders need to identify the sources of policy makers’ distrust. Why do policy makers question their dedication and competence? Is it justified? Do unions in fact protect the incompetent? Has the profession sacrificed student learning in the pursuit of better working conditions? As Covey points out “people tend to judge others based on behavior and judge themselves based on intent”.\(^{44}\) When trust is lost it is incredibly difficult but not impossible to regain, and the first step to redeveloping a trusting
relationship is for both policy makers and policy implementers to examine their own intentions and behaviors.

High trust systems attract the very best people who want to make a career of education by insisting on high entry standards for teachers and school leaders, providing reasonable working conditions and salaries\textsuperscript{45} for staff and above all promoting professional autonomy, collaboration, and trust. There is no quick and easy template to follow to achieve educational excellence. Nations and school systems can learn from one another and should, but each is shaped by its own history, culture, geography, and politics, and successful policies in one context may not transfer easily to another. But what we do know is that regardless of context, successful school systems like flourishing businesses\textsuperscript{46} and successful democracies only prosper when those who create policies and those who must carry them through to completion trust each other.

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{7} Program of International Student Assessment
\bibitem{9} Office for Standards in Education
\end{thebibliography}
I applaud and appreciate Michael’s recognition of the ‘wrong and right drivers’, but for me his choice of the term ‘drivers’ is problematic. It implies that someone has determined a direction and holds the reins that “drive” his or her minions towards preconceived goals. You can drive cars, you can drive horses and you can drive golf balls but I doubt that you can do more than ‘move’ people temporarily from one place to another using the methods he describes. For long-term sustainable change, policy makers and implementers need to work together and be mutually supportive in pursuit of agreed upon goals. Perhaps ‘initiators’ is a better term. I may be accused of quibbling but semantics is important.


Covey op.cit.

Conservatives and Liberal Democrats.


Bubble children refer to children who appear to be slightly below the criteria to pass an exam and with help could pass. By focusing on these students often to the detriment of those who would have difficulty meeting the standard, the school and its teachers can raise the test scores and look good to their examiners. When salaries and/or tenure are tied to test scores, it becomes a very seductive strategy.


Ibid, p.20.


Both Finland and Canada rate are among the most trusted countries in the world. On the 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index, Finland scored 9.2 and Canada 8.9, whereas the United Kingdom scored 7.8 and the U.S. 7.1, http://www.locationselector.com/images/stories/featured_reports/CPI_report_ForWeb.pdf

Canada and Finland significantly out perform the United States and United Kingdom in reading, mathematics and science (OECD, 2010, PISA 2009 results: what students know and can do, vol. 1.).

“Resilient students are those who come from a disadvantaged socio-economic background and perform much higher than would be predicted by their background.” Canada and Finland are well above the OECD average while the United States and the United Kingdom are well below that average. OECD (2010), PISA 2000:Overcoming social back ground, vol.2. pp.62-63.
Percent of variance in student performance explained by socio economic status, Finland, 7.8%, Canada, 8.6 %, United Kingdom 13.7% and the U.S. 16.8 %, (OECD, 2010, PISA 2009, Results: overcoming social background, vol.2.)

Finland and Canada spend 3.6% and 3.5% percent of GDP respectively on non tertiary education, whereas the United States and the United Kingdom spend 4.0% and 4.4% respectively, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/48/37864432.pdf


See note 31


See, Tucker, Ibid; Darling-Hammond, op cit; Ravitch, op.cit for full discussions of the American equity dilemma.

OECD (2010), Ibid.


These are British and American fast track programs designed to encourage top-flight graduates to become teachers. Both have had some successes but the turnover rate for both is quite high. Similarly Future Leaders is a British program to compensate for the shortage of educators willing to assume headships. Such programs have not been necessary in high trust systems where teaching and leadership are more attractive.


Finland and Canada have always paid relatively well and attract the top 30% of the university graduates into teaching.

Covey, op. cit, provides innumerable examples of the importance of trust for business success.